



# FOREIGN POLICY BULLETIN

*An interpretation of current international events by the Research Staff of the Foreign Policy Association*

FOREIGN POLICY ASSOCIATION, Incorporated

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## ACTS NOT WORDS WILL BE TEST OF DUMBARTON OAKS BLUEPRINT

THE admittedly tentative Proposals for the Establishment of a General International Organization to be known as the "United Nations," formulated by representatives of the United States, Britain, Russia and China during the Dumbarton Oaks conversations held in Washington between August 21 and October 7, are bound to be received with mixed feelings. So much poignant hope had been placed during the grim war years in the possibility of establishing an international organization that would prevent similar holocausts in the future that the draft charter made public on October 9 will be viewed by many as falling short of their expectations. And those who have feared that the Big Four would, at least in the first instance, create a great-power directorate whose authority in matters of security would have to be acknowledged by the smaller nations will feel that the charter confirms their fears.

**THE POSSIBLE VS. THE DESIRABLE.** In judging the published results of Dumbarton Oaks, however, it is only fair to bear in mind that not all the goals which seem desirable in relations between nations are, in practice, attainable today. The very fact that the United Nations are still far from having won the war either in Europe or Asia gives far more weight to the possession of military power than would be the case once hostilities are over. And no one can deny that if the influence of a nation is to be judged in terms of military power—leaving out

all considerations of its peacetime contribution to civilization—then the United States, Britain and Russia are obviously the countries whose decisions affect most profoundly both the course of the war and the character of the peace. Of the three, Russia is reported to have placed the strongest emphasis on the necessity of leaving major decisions concerning world security to the great powers. This is due at least as much to its uninhibited bluntness in appraising international relations as to any peculiar attachment on its part to the prerogatives of a great power. For the United States and Britain have not hesitated, when the occasion presented itself, to act on the assumptions expressed by Russia.

According to the Dumbarton Oaks proposals, then, the keystone of the projected international organization will be the Security Council, composed of five permanent members—the United States, Britain, Russia, China, and France "in due course"—and six non-permanent members to be elected by a General Assembly composed of all the United Nations, whose functions, as defined in the charter, will be primarily advisory. In addition, there are to be a Secretariat, an International Court of Justice, an Economic and Social Council (to consist of representatives of eighteen nations elected by the General Assembly for three years), and "such subsidiary agencies as may be found necessary."

**UNANSWERED QUESTIONS.** The charter thus outlines, in skeleton form, an international organization whose very lack of elaborateness gives it a degree of flexibility which could make it adaptable to the unforeseeable eventualities of the post-war period. It makes no pretense to completeness. There are many blank spots to be filled out—of which two are most important: first, whether a permanent member will have the right to vote in cases when it is charged with having committed aggression; and, second, the agreement by which the members will

### DINNER FOR PRESIDENT ROOSEVELT

The Foreign Policy Association will give a dinner in honor of the President of the United States on Saturday, October 21, at eight o'clock, at The Waldorf-Astoria. The subject of discussion will be "The Foreign Policy of the United States." Members are urged to make their reservations at once, since the number of tickets is limited.

specify the armed forces they will place at the disposal of the United Nations organization; and the circumstances under which their delegates on the Security Council will vote concerning the use of such forces. Both questions involve the issue of sovereignty, and can be expected to cause far-reaching discussion, especially in the United States.

The feature of the proposed organization which will concern the general public most, however, is that it could easily be transformed into a dictatorship of the four great powers which—on the plea of preserving peace—could, if they wanted to, enforce their will on weaker nations. Such a possibility is strengthened by the provisions for regional security arrangements, which each of the great powers could invoke to dictate the terms of security within adjoining areas that would then become spheres of influence under another name. Moreover, Russia's reluctance to accept a proposal that a great power charged with aggression should abstain from voting when its case is being considered by the Security Council—as suggested by China—will be interpreted by smaller nations as a portent that the great powers will consider themselves exempt from the restrictions on aggressive action which they intend to enforce on others.

These doubts and fears are well justified, and may lead many people to dismiss the Dumbarton Oaks document as mere sugar-coating for another Concert of Powers—this time not for Europe alone, as in 1815, but for the world, to be administered by methods which, for all their modern streamlining, will be those of Metternich. If we are to look at the situation without illusions, however, we must recognize that the operation of any international machinery that may be devised will depend on the sense of

responsibility of the great powers, and on their willingness to have it work not only when it is to their own advantage, but also when it is to the advantage of the international community as a whole. No blueprint, no matter how realistic, will of itself generate such spirit of collaboration. But if such spirit does exist, it can put even the most inferior machinery to work. The desire for collaboration will not be tested by the formulation of any given document or even by its acceptance on the part of any given government. It will be tested by the measure of agreement that the United Nations will reach on controversial issues, of which that of Poland—presumably on the Churchill-Stalin agenda in Moscow—is the most urgent.

It may prove just as well that the United Nations charter raises no high hopes, and does not lend itself to sentimental oratory about eternal peace. For this should make us all aware that if we, and the people of the other United Nations, do not want international organization to become merely an instrument for the selfish designs of the great powers, then we shall have to press unremittingly for altered attitudes toward relations between nations. It will depend on our concerted efforts whether the proposed organization becomes merely a military alliance, or an agency which will "facilitate solutions of international economic, social and other humanitarian problems and promote respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms." And we must never forget that the alternative to at least some kind of international organization, no matter how inadequate, is a policy of each one for himself, and the devil take the hindmost—whose predictable outcome is another world war.

VERA MICHELES DEAN

## INTERNAL WEAKNESSES CRIPPLE CHINA'S WAR EFFORT

The world witnessed last week the ironic spectacle of a Chinese military spokesman rebuking the British Prime Minister for overestimating the contributions of the United States to China's war effort. In an address of September 28 to the House of Commons Winston Churchill expressed regret that, despite "lavish American help," China had suffered severe military setbacks, including the loss of important airfields. "It is," he said, "one of the most disappointing vexations." On October 2 a spokesman for the Chinese Military Council in Chungking, while praising the activities of Major General Chennault's airmen as well as American efforts to bring in supplies, referred to the United States Fourteenth Air Force in China as "so small it would hardly be credited if it could be disclosed," and stressed China's lack of military equipment. The following day President Roosevelt declared that the United States is now delivering to China more than 20,000 tons of supplies a month by air, as compared with 2,000 about a year

ago. He described this American aid as epochal in character, in view of the difficulties that had to be overcome.

**WHO IS LETTING CHINA DOWN?** Each of these statements on China's supply situation displays one facet of the truth, for the efforts of the United States to send aid to China have been vigorous and far-reaching, at the same time that the quantities delivered have been extremely small in relation to China's needs. But the cause of controversy does not lie in the facts themselves, which are well understood by the governments concerned. What is at issue is the responsibility for China's current military disintegration. Washington and London imply that the responsibility cannot be placed on them because they are doing their maximum under the conditions imposed by the war with Germany and Japan's favorable geographic position. Chungking counters with the statement that this maximum is not sufficient to enable China to hold the Japanese. The question, then, is

whether Japan's blockade of China is the main factor behind its recent successes in that country.

Even the most cursory investigation reveals that much more than the blockade is involved in China's present crisis. It is the testimony of a host of foreign observers that the weakness of the Chinese Central armies arises not merely from lack of equipment, important as this deficiency is, but also from such internal conditions as the mishandling of troops, political differences among generals, widespread discontent with methods of conscription, popular dissatisfaction with the corrupt behavior of many military leaders, and Chungking's failure to use to the full machinery available for war production. Certainly it is not the fault of any outside power that, according to a recent estimate, only one out of every twenty Chinese conscripts reaches the front lines, or that men are picked up at random on the streets by armed officials and impressed into the army. Nor are China's allies responsible for the sharp disagreements among local generals which contributed to the seizure of Changsha last June.

**THE LESSON OF HONAN.** The internal shortcomings of Chungking's military organization already had been revealed in northern Honan province in May, when a Japanese force not exceeding 100,000 men broke up and defeated Chinese divisions containing seven times as many troops. At the very beginning of the Honan campaign a large proportion of the trucks available to the Chinese military were used for the evacuation to Sian of the families and possessions of army officers and civilian officials, while oxen and ox-carts essential to the existence of the local peasantry were commandeered for military transport. This, it should be noted, was done to the very peasants who in 1943 suffered one of the worst famines in China's recent history, partly because the army at that time insisted on collecting grain taxes even though drought had created a serious food shortage.

The fruits of these years of mistreatment of the Honan peasantry were finally reaped when the Chinese armies began to disintegrate under Japanese attacks. The Chinese peasants—perhaps incited by local pro-Japanese elements—actually disarmed their own soldiers—first individually, then in groups. According to one estimate, the peasants took away 50,000 rifles from the troops under Tang En-po, the top Chinese general in the area, and raised the reactionary slogan, "Better the soldiers of Japan than the soldiers of Tang En-po." Apparently, Chungking's political authority broke down when its military posi-

tion was weakened, and the local population was at last able to give vent to its long-suppressed feeling of bitterness.

**CRITICISM INSIDE CHINA.** It is sometimes suggested that American criticism of conditions in Chungking territory is equivalent to hostility toward China. But the fact is that China is seething with internal criticism—as the recent session of the People's Political Council indicated—and that frank appraisals of existing conditions by foreign writers are merely a pallid reflection of what millions of Chinese are themselves thinking and saying. The Honan campaign and ensuing military defeats proved an enormous shock to the Chinese public and brought forth a flood of protests against the evils that had helped to weaken the country. Chinese critics of their own government are naturally well aware of the difficulties created by the Japanese blockade, but do not consider this an excuse for leaving undone things that China can do for itself or permitting unsatisfactory internal conditions to continue.

Today Chungking is facing the most serious crisis of the war. Not since the seizure of the Generalissimo at Sian in December 1936, when rebellious officers insisted on the abandonment of appeasement and the launching of resistance to Japan, have Chiang and his government had to deal with such deep-seated popular dissatisfaction. As China's outstanding national leader, Chiang Kai-shek now faces decisions of crucial importance concerning the government's policies and the men who are to carry them out. For criticism is well-nigh universal and extends into the Kuomintang itself where conservative businessmen and bankers find themselves standing together with liberal intellectuals against machine bosses who personify corrupt, oppressive administration. In this internal struggle, responsible foreign criticism and advice are welcomed by forward-looking Chinese. They realize that unless China undergoes an internal reorganization making for greater efficiency and democracy, their country may emerge from the war in so weak and disunited a condition as to be unable to rally its strength rapidly or to play a significant role in world affairs. They also recognize that discussion of these problems by Americans is as much in China's interest as our own, since the duration of the war with Japan and the future peace of the Far East will be affected by current developments in Chungking. At the same time they desire—as do all Americans—the earliest possible increase in Allied military aid on the China front.

LAWRENCE K. ROSINGER


(This is the first in a series of articles on conditions in China.)

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# Washington News Letter



## WILL NATIONAL SOVEREIGNTY IMPEDE UNRRA'S WORK?

The foremost political problem besetting the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration, now almost a year old, is how to accomplish its job without infringing on the sovereignty of member nations. The use of UNRRA requires international collaboration, first in providing adequate assistance to former enemy nations—notably Italy, to which the UNRRA Council, at its second session held in Montreal from September 15 to 26, voted to contribute \$50,000,000 worth of supplies. Second, cooperation among many nations is essential in dealing with the problem of displaced persons. In Germany alone, UNRRA estimates, 8,000,000 civilians from other countries will need assistance in returning to their homes. Third, only through international collaboration will it prove possible to obtain the great stocks of food, clothing and medicines required for relief of the liberated areas in Europe and Asia.

The shortage of shipping and the scarcity of many of the goods urgently needed have so far made it impossible for the Combined Production and Resources Board and the Combined Food Board to allocate supplies in the desired amounts except in a few categories. Some supply measures have been taken. For example, UNRRA is making arrangements with Canadian authorities for the production of woolen textiles. Canada, Newfoundland and Iceland may supply fish. It may prove desirable, however, to continue food rationing in the United States, and perhaps Britain, in order to fill overseas relief needs as the period of military relief, planned to last about six months, draws to a close in each liberated country.

**YUGOSLAVS RAISE AN ISSUE.** Whatever may be the source of relief, the nations which need supplies seek control over their distribution. On August

21 Sir Arthur Salter, Deputy Director General of UNRRA, said: "We are essentially there to help the constituted authorities and not to replace them." That has been UNRRA's policy since its creation at Atlantic City in November 1943. On March 9, 1944 UNRRA decided to support proposals of individual governments for separate purchases of relief supplies, provided that such buying would not "interfere with the Administration's own efforts to bring about the creation of reserves which will be available wherever and whenever the need arises." Norway, the Netherlands, Belgium, and the French Committee of National Liberation have proposed advance purchases. By contrast, it was reported that Marshal Tito and Dr. Ivan Subasich, Prime Minister of the Yugoslav government-in-exile, had reached complete accord regarding a number of matters, including the proposal to obtain assistance from UNRRA.

Yet on October 2 the Free Yugoslav Radio announced that the Yugoslav Committee of National Liberation (controlled by Tito) had refused to accept UNRRA assistance because, the radio said, the agency wanted to distribute relief in Yugoslavia through its own machinery rather than through the "already established organs of the people's authority." This difference could be easily mended, for the policy enunciated by Salter stressed the use of "already established organs." It is possible, however, that the Yugoslav problem will remain open until the Soviet Union makes a decision on the extent to which it will cooperate with UNRRA in the rehabilitation of its own devastated areas and in the relief of United Nations countries of Eastern Europe.

BLAIR BOLLES

Statement of the Ownership, Management, Circulation, Etc.,  
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State of New York, County of New York, ss.

Before me, a Notary Public in and for the State and county aforesaid, personally appeared Vera Michele Dean, who, having been duly sworn according to law, deposes and says that she is the Editor of the FOREIGN POLICY BULLETIN, and that the following is, to the best of her knowledge and belief, a true statement of the ownership, management, etc., of the aforesaid publication for the date shown in the above caption, required by the Act of August 24, 1912, as amended by the Act of March 3, 1933, embodied in Section 537, Postal Laws and Regulations, printed on the reverse of this form, to wit:

1. That the names and addresses of the publisher, editor, managing editor, and business managers are:

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Editor—Vera Michele Dean, 22 East 38th Street, New York 16, N. Y.

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2. That the owner is:

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are: Frank Ross McCoy, President; Dorothy F. Leet, Secretary; both of 22 East 38th Street, New York 16, N. Y.; and William A. Eldridge, Treasurer, 70 Broadway, New York 4, N. Y.

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FOREIGN POLICY ASSOCIATION, Incorporated.

By VERA MICHELES DEAN, Editor.

Sworn to and subscribed before me this 28th day of September, 1944.

[Seal]

CAROLYN E. MARTIN, Notary Public.

New York County, New York, County Clerk's No. 87; New York County Reg. No. 164-M-3. (My commission expires March 30, 1945.)

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